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Abstract 
This paper investigates the taxation of investments in the Asia-Pacific region. Our analysis is based on 
the methodology of Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003) for determining effective average tax rates. 
This approach allows us to account for important national and international tax regulations. Our results 
show that the overall dispersion of effective tax burdens in Asia-Pacific ranges from 10.6% in Hong 
Kong to 40.4% in India for domestic investments (overall average of 23.4%). In 8 out of 19 
jurisdictions covered, investments are, however, effectively taxed at a rate between 20% and 25%. If 
the investment is made by a foreign investor, cross-border taxation has a significant impact on the 
overall tax burden. In any of the Asia-Pacific jurisdictions, foreign direct investments by a 
Singaporean or a German parent company are on average taxed at 29.2% and at 32.8% in case of a US 
investor. Meanwhile, tax incentives for the stimulation of private investment reduce the effective 
average tax rate by 8.6 percentage points on average. Fiscal incentives targeted at investments in the 
high technology sector or the development of specific geographic areas result in the lowest effective 
tax burdens. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Between 2000 and 2012 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of economies in the Asia-Pacific 
region grew at a rate of 5.56% p.a. on average,1 leaving all other regions in the world well 
behind in terms of growth.2 Today, the region still experiences economic transformations, 
with many developing countries heading for their next stage of development and new 
countries calling the world’s attention. The objective of China's latest Five-Year Plan to 
increase the country’s minimum wage standard by 13% on average each year3 as well as 
capacities being shifted towards the high-end manufacturing sector,4 both have significant 
implications for the country’s economy. According to the most recent World Investment 
Report, high technology industries in China now attract both foreign and domestic investment 
and the country’s economy is involved in more advanced activities of the value chain.5 While 
production costs in China are rising, labour-intensive industries move southward to countries 
like Vietnam and Cambodia.6 Other countries such as Mongolia, Laos and Myanmar have 
recently attracted foreign investment mainly because of natural resources.7 Between 2010 and 
2012, foreign direct investment (FDI) into Myanmar and Mongolia increased by 175% and 
260% respectively, while FDI into Cambodia doubled within those two years.8 Moreover, as a 
major step towards more regional integration, the ten member-states of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will form the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), by 
2015.9  
 
Against the background of these developments this paper takes a closer look at taxation of 
private investments in Asia-Pacific countries. Among other aspects, such as the country's 
legal framework, infrastructure, market access and labour costs, taxes are regarded as one 
influential factor of investment decisions. 10  Various studies provide evidence on the 
responsiveness of FDI to changes in the tax burden.11 Devereux and Griffith (2003) argue that 
discrete investment choices, such as location decisions, depend on effective average tax 
burdens. In their meta-study Feld and Heckemeyer (2010) reveal that an investment’s 
sensitivity to effective tax rates capturing bilateral taxation is substantially higher compared to 
the statutory tax rate and effective tax rates at the unilateral level.  
We will therefore consider effective tax rates to investigate the tax burden of investments in 
the Asia-Pacific region. Besides the corporate income tax rate, depreciation rules, non-income 
taxes and other features of the national tax code and international tax treaties affect the 
effective tax burden of an investment. To account for these factors, this paper makes use of an 
                                                 
1 This figure combines annual growth rates of all countries covered in this paper. See below.  
2 World Bank Open Data (2014) average annual % growth of GDP. Worldwide GDP grew by 2.7 % p.a. during 
the same period of time.  
3 See Deng (2011) available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/05/c_13762230.htm. 
4 See IMF (2012)  pp. 37 f.  
5 See UNCTAD (2013) p. 46. 
6 See UNCTAD (2013) p. 46. 
7 See UNCTAD (2013) pp. 46 f and IMF (2012). 
8 See UNCTAD (2013) p. 214. 
9 See ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank (2013) p. i. 
10See OECD (2007) p.77. 
11 Meta-studies by De Mooij/Ederveen (2003) and Feld/Heckemeyer (2011) analyse the results of previous 
research on this topic.  
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approach developed by Devereux and Griffith (1999). Based on their methodology, we 
compute the tax burden on domestic investments and outbound investments by a parent 
company from Germany, Singapore and the United States in selected Asia-Pacific countries. 
In order to stimulate investment in certain activities or industries, countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region, especially the ASEAN countries, rely on tax incentives. Therefore we will take a 
closer look at the impact such incentives have on an investment’s tax burden. The following 
analysis covers Australia, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao 
PR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, 
Russia, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand and Vietnam.12 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 1 the methodology applied and 
the underlying tax regimes of countries in the Asia-Pacific region are introduced. Based on 
those parameters, we then calculate the EATR for domestic investments in Asia-Pacific 
countries and cross-border outbound investments undertaken by parent companies from 
Germany, Singapore and the United States (US). In section 4 we further assess the impact of 
tax incentives on the effective tax burden. The last section summarizes the findings. 
 
 
2. Methodology and Underlying Tax Regimes 
2.1 Methodology and Assumptions 
When evaluating the impact of taxation on investment choices, effective tax rates play an 
important role. Widely recognized measures of effective tax levels include the effective 
marginal tax rate (EMTR) by King and Fullerton (1984) and the effective average tax rate 
(EATR) by Devereux and Griffith (1999 and 2003). These forward-looking approaches are 
particularly suited for estimating the effect of taxation on future investment decisions, as they 
assume a hypothetical investment and estimate tax payments associated with this particular 
decision. Besides statutory tax rates they incorporate important tax base regulations and non-
profit taxes. Both measures have already been applied in numerous international studies (e.g. 
European Commission (2002 and 2013)). The intuition behind both approaches is to identify 
the relative wedge between pre- and post-tax values of the investment in a consistent 
framework. In the context of multinational firms’ location choices, the EATR has proved to 
be the most relevant to depict the respective tax attractiveness of potential host countries of 
FDI.13 
The EATR can be calculated in a domestic setting, taking only the local tax system into 
account, and internationally, by incorporating withholding taxes and the treatment of cross-
border dividends or interests in the investor’s residence country.  
Our analysis considers an investor undertaking a manufacturing project located in the Asia-
Pacific region. The firm equally invests in five different assets, namely intangibles acquired 
from third parties, industrial buildings, machinery, financial assets, and inventory. As our 
                                                 
12 In the following the Hong Kong SAR is referred to as Hong Kong; Lao PR as Laos; the Republic of Korea as 
South Korea and Taiwan Province of China as Taiwan. The term Taiwan Province of China corresponds to the 
official terminology adopted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations in order to refer 
to the territory of the island of Taiwan. This paper covers the majority of the countries that belong to the Asia 
and Pacific region as defined by the IMF: https://www.imf.org/external/oap/about.htm 
13 See Devereux/Griffith 2003. 
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focus will be on the effects of taxation, other economic factors such as inflation and real 
economic depreciations are held constant. Our assumptions on these variables are in line with 
other studies that apply the same methodology and are presented in Table A1 in the appendix. 
For explanations on how to include debt financing, capital taxes, valuation methods and other 
common features of tax systems see European Commission (2013). The methodology is 
discussed in greater detail in Devereux and Griffith (1999 and 2003) as well as in Schreiber, 
Spengel and Lammersen (2002).  
 
2.2 Tax Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region 
The computation of the EATR is based on significant features of the respective country’s tax 
system (e.g. depreciation allowances, profit and non-profit tax rates). Hence, we briefly 
survey the tax regimes in the considered territories.  
In line with global trends to cut corporate income tax rates, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea 
and India have steadily reduced their tax rates since the early 1990s.14 In most other countries 
tax rates remained rather stable until just recently. 15  Starting with China in 2008 these 
territories cut their rates, sometimes by as much as 10 percentage points within two years as 
Thailand did in 2012/13. Having reduced its corporate income tax rate from 25% to 22% in 
2014, Vietnam already announced a further reduction down to 20% for 2016. Nowadays the 
vast majority of the countries levy corporate income tax rates of 20% to 25%. The average 
rate of all territories in the Asia-Pacific region also amounts to 25%. The lowest tax rate 
imposed on profits is at 15% in Hong Kong, while India is leading the high tax countries in 
the region with a tax rate of 45.2% imposed on distributed profits. Whereas the tax rate on 
retained earnings is only at 34% in India, the opposite is true for Taiwan which levies 17% on 
distributed profits but demands 25.3% for retained ones. Table A2 in the appendix gives an 
overview of nominal and combined statutory tax rates, which include surcharges and local 
business taxes, for jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific region.  
Besides taxing income from business activities, corporations can also be subject to non-
income taxes such as property tax on one or all business assets. In all countries covered these 
taxes are deductible from corporate income tax. Therefore the effective tax burden differs 
from nominal tax rates.16  
When computing the tax base, depreciation rules and valuation methods of assets in use have 
to be considered. Buildings and intangibles have to be depreciated on a straight-line basis in 
most countries. Singapore, however, entirely prohibits the depreciation of industrial buildings 
and acquired intangible assets. For machinery the most common pattern is the declining 
balance method. However, in most cases straight-line depreciation is allowed as well. If two 
or more depreciation schedules are available, we employ the one resulting in the lowest tax 
burden when computing the tax base. Table A4 in the appendix summarizes the durations, 
depreciation rates and valuation methods applied in our analysis. 
Only six countries in Asia-Pacific permit corporations to value their inventory using the last-
in-first-out (LIFO) method. If applied, this method results in the lowest tax burden.  
Everywhere else, the most favourable method allowed is a valuation based on weighted 
                                                 
14 See Endres, Fuest, Spengel et al. (2010) pp. 65 f. 
15 See Endres, Fuest, Spengel et al. (2010) pp. 65 f. 
16 For details on the respective nominal and real tax rates on property and real estate see Table A3. 
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averages. Furthermore, in some countries interest paid by a corporation cannot be fully 
deducted when computing the tax base. This is the case for the tax base of the local business 
tax in the Philippines and a surcharge on the so-called business scale enterprise tax in Japan.17 
In Hong Kong we find the reversed situation. Interest payments received by a non-financial 
institution from a deposit in Hong Kong are exempt from profit tax. In our model this 
regulation affects the taxation of financial assets.  
 
 
3. Effective Average Tax Rates for Domestic and Cross-Border Investments in 
the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
3.1 Effective Average Tax Rates for Domestic Investments 
Based on parameters of the national tax codes that have been discussed above, it is now 
possible to assess the EATR for investments in the covered jurisdictions. As a first step we 
now consider domestic investments or investments at the subsidiary level. 
Our results, displayed in Figure 1, show that the effective tax burden is on average 1.63 
percentage points lower than the combined statutory tax rate. The overall dispersion of 
EATRs in the Asia-Pacific region is quite substantial ranging from 10.6% in Hong Kong to 
40.4% in India. It is, however, striking that 12 out of 19 countries tax investments at an 
effective rate between 15% and 25%. This result is mainly driven by similar statutory tax 
rates applied by these jurisdictions. With the exception of Singapore, an EATR of 15% to 
25% goes in line with a statutory tax rate of 20% to 25%. Hence, for purely domestic 
investments these countries offer quite a level playing field in terms of taxation. 
Very generous depreciation patterns in Hong Kong and Laos (EATR of 21.1%) lead to 
EATRs that are 6 and 3 points respectively lower than the corporate income tax rate of the 
national tax code. The opposite effect can be observed in Singapore, where depreciation of 
industrial buildings and acquired intangibles has been abandoned for tax purposes. These 
regulations result in an EATR of 18.6% exceeding the statutory tax rate of 17% on 
investments in Singapore. Therefore, investors in Cambodia, Taiwan and Thailand face lower 
effective tax burdens, although statutory tax rates of these territories are higher than in 
Singapore. In the case of Japan, multiple non-income tax rates lead to an EATR that exceeds 
the combined statutory tax rate by 1.7 percentage points. Since we assume that only 10% of 
the investment is financed by new equity, the impact of the 15% dividend distribution tax on 
the EATR in India is limited. The EATR for an investment in India is at 40.4% compared to a 
corporate income tax of 45.2% on distributed profits.  
                                                 
17 This tax is included in the 20.7% surcharge in Table A2. For details on the Japanese corporate tax system and 
the multiple surcharges imposed see Tax Research Platform of the IBFD.  
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 Figure 1 – Comparison of EATRs and statutory tax rates of Asia-Pacific jurisdictions 
 
Source: Own calculations. For exact values see Table A5. 
 
3.2 Analysis of Effective Tax Burdens on Cross-Border Investments 
Asia-Pacific countries are top destinations for FDI. In its Regional Economic Outlook 2014 
the IMF reports that countries in Emerging Asia attract nearly one quarter of worldwide 
FDI.18 In 2012 FDI into countries covered by this survey has been more than four times 
higher than in 2000 and even ten times higher than in 1993.19  
In 2008 China ended its preferential tax treatment for foreign investment enterprises (FIEs). 
Against the background of this tax reform, An (2012) sets up a quasi-experiment providing 
empirical evidence on the impact of taxation on FDI for an Asian jurisdiction. It is shown that 
foreign investors, who no longer receive preferential tax treatment after the reform, respond 
by reducing their investment in China.20 Moreover, the study confirms that taxation impacts 
FDI in emerging economies in Asia We therefore address the effective tax burden of inbound 
investments into Asia-Pacific in the following section.  
Several additional tax factors have to be considered for such an investment. Firstly, payments 
from the subsidiary to the parent company, like dividends and interests, are subject to 
withholding taxes in most Asia-Pacific territories. In some cases this additional tax burden 
can be reduced by tax treaties between the investment's host and home country. This is, for 
example, the case for an outbound investment from Germany to the Philippines where the 
original withholding tax rate on dividends is reduced from 15% to 10%. An overview of 
withholding tax rates levied on dividends and interests is provided in Table A6 in the 
appendix. The rates presented are those for outbound investments from Germany, Singapore 
and the US, all of which will be discussed in the following. Secondly, dividend and interest 
                                                 
18 See IMF (2014a) p. 21. According to the definition of the IMF, Emerging Asia covers all countries located in 
the Asia-Pacific region - excluding developed countries. See IMF (2014b). 
19 See UNCTAD (2014a) Database. Prior to 1993 no data for Russia are available. 
20 An (2012) p. 669. 
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payments received by the parent company can be subject to corporate income tax in the 
investment's home country. To avoid double taxation these jurisdictions might either fully 
exempt dividends from taxation or credit taxes paid abroad when computing the tax liability. 
The latter method is also applied to avoid double taxation of interests. In the following we 
address the effects of both methods. 
 
a. German Outbound Investment 
The first cross-border scenario we consider in our analysis covers investments by a German 
parent company into any of the Asia-Pacific jurisdictions. Dividend payments received by the 
parent company are exempt from taxation in Germany. Meanwhile, the credit method is 
applied for interest payments. Additionally, 5% of dividend payments between affiliates are 
regarded as business expenses and are thus subject to taxation. Germany further signed tax 
treaties with most of the jurisdictions considered by this paper. Exemptions are Cambodia, 
Laos and Myanmar.  
Figure 2 compares the EATR for domestic investments and investments by a German parent 
company. In this setting an investment to Japan (43.6%) still bears the highest effective tax 
burden, while the EATR for Hong Kong (12.1%) remains the lowest. Considering the average 
of all countries, the average EATR for investments in the Asia-Pacific region increases from 
23.4% to 29.2%. From the perspective of a German investor, withholding taxes on dividends, 
have a significant impact, on the ranking of investment locations according to effective tax 
burdens, because they cannot be credited and thus become a definite tax burden. Territories 
that do not levy any withholding taxes on dividends, such as Vietnam, Malaysia and 
Myanmar, are relatively more attractive for an outbound investment from Germany than for a 
domestic one. For other jurisdictions, such as Cambodia and Taiwan, withholding taxes result 
in an increase of the EATR by more than 10 percentage points compared to the domestic case. 
For cross-border investments from Germany the EATR is higher than 35% in five countries, 
namely the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, India and Japan.  
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Figure 2 – Comparison of effective average tax rates of domestic and German outbound 
investments in the Asia-Pacific region 
 
Source: Own calculations. For exact values see Table A5. 
b. Singaporean Outbound Investment 
To address the increasing importance of regional headquarters in Asia-Pacific, we further 
investigate the effective tax burden of outbound investments from Singapore. Singapore is not 
only one of the top host destinations for foreign investments (currently ranked number 8), but 
also belongs to the top 16 investing economies worldwide. 21  As early as 2003 22  the 
Singaporean government set up a Headquarter Programme to promote the creation of a 
headquarter hub attracting overhead activities from all kinds of industries and geographic 
origins.23 Companies participating in the programme are entitled to tax incentives, which will 
be further assessed in Section 4 of this paper.  
Figure 3 presents the EATR on investments by a Singaporean parent company in other Asia-
Pacific jurisdictions. To avoid double taxation of dividends, Singapore fully exempts income 
from dividends. An investment in a subsidiary located in Hong Kong receives the most 
preferential tax treatment (EATR of 11.9%). With regard to investments in Taiwan, we 
observe significant changes compared to the domestic setting. In a domestic setting the 
effective tax burden of Taiwanese investments is the second lowest (14.9%). However, 
Taiwan and Singapore do not have any tax treaty in place. Withholding tax rates of 20% on 
dividend and interest payments24 to a Singaporean parent company thus result in an EATR 
that is as high as 32.6% for this particular cross-border scenario. Only investments in four 
other jurisdictions bear higher tax burdens.  
                                                 
21 See UNCTAD (2014b) pp. xiv and xv. 
22 See Leow/Wong/Ke (2010). 
23 See Singapore Economic Development Board (2014). 
24 20% is the highest rate levied by any of the Asia-Pacific jurisdictions.  
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The average EATR for a Singaporean inbound investment in other Asia-Pacific countries is 
29.2% and thus the same as for a German parent company. Differences in the ranking 
between the Singaporean and the German scenario can be attributed to two major 
determinants. Firstly, both countries differ with respect to the treaty structure and withholding 
tax rates applicable in the host countries. In particular, investments in China, New Zealand or 
Japan are more favourable in terms of taxation from a Singaporean investor's perspective than 
from a German one.25 The respective EATRs in case of a German parent company are 31.5%, 
37.5% and 43.6% compared to 28.4%, 31.7% and 41.4% for investments from Singapore. For 
all three settings these differences result from lower withholding taxes on dividends. By 
contrast, the example of Myanmar shows that lower withholding tax rates on interest 
payments do not have a significant impact on the EATR.26 
 
Figure 3 - EATRs of Singaporean outbound investments in the Asia-Pacific region 
 
Source: Own calculations. For exact values see Table A5. 
 
Secondly, the EATR is affected by the source of finance applied on the parent and the 
subsidiary level. Since interest payments are deductible for tax purposes in most cases, it is 
more favourable to finance an investment from a low-tax country to a high-tax country by 
granting a loan to the subsidiary. This method helps to shift profits in form of interest 
payments to the low-tax country. The example of an outbound investment to Malaysia 
illustrates this effect. Since the corporate income tax is 8% percentage points lower in 
Singapore than in Malaysia, interests deducted from the tax base in Malaysia are taxed at the 
lower Singaporean corporate income tax rate. Meanwhile interest payments received by a 
                                                 
25 The Chinese and the German government already signed a new tax treaty in March 2014, which has yet to be 
ratified by the respective legislative bodies. If it enters into force, withholding taxes on dividends paid by a 
Chinese subsidiary will be reduced to 5% (compared to 10% nowadays). Federal Republic of Germany/People’s 
Republic of China (2014). 
26 The EATR for both scenarios differs by 0.02 percentage points, while withholding tax rates on interest 
payments differ by 5 percentage points.  
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German parent company bear a higher tax burden than under Malaysian tax law. Equity 
financing thus results in a lower tax burden for the German investor. According to the 
assumptions made for the purpose of this paper, the majority of the investment is financed by 
equity, which leads to a slight advantage for the German investor (EATR of 23.36% 
compared to 23.37% in Singapore). The comparison of Singapore and Germany clearly 
highlights the importance of international tax treaties27 and the way an investment is financed. 
 
c. American Outbound Investment  
In the US, dividend payments by affiliates are not exempt from taxation at home but instead 
taxes paid abroad can be credited against claims by the US tax authorities. As our results 
presented in Figure 4 show, the impact of the host country’s corporate income tax rate on the 
overall tax burden is substantially limited by the underlying US credit regime. The EATR of a 
domestic investment in the US is currently at 36.5%. The assumption that part of the 
investment is financed by retained earnings partially limits taxation by the home country. 
Most cross-border investments thus still face a lower tax burden than a domestic one. Only 
investments in countries that apply higher tax rates than the US, namely Japan, the Philippines 
and India, bear an excess overall effective tax burden. For the remaining jurisdictions the 
EATR ranges from 29.1% for Hong Kong to 36.5% for an investment in Mongolia. 
Non-income taxes that are not creditable against the US tax liability gain in importance. 
Whereas Russia ranks among the five most favourable destinations in terms of taxation for 
investments from Germany and Singapore, the country, from a tax perspective, hardly makes 
it to the top ten list of an US investor. This outcome results from a 2% real estate tax imposed 
on investments in Russia.  
In addition to non-income taxes and retained earnings, the effective tax burden is further 
influenced by the computation of the tax burden. Although the US corporate income tax rate 
is applied to compute the minimum tax burden on dividends received by a subsidiary located 
in Asia-Pacific, the host country’s tax code determines the underlying tax base. An investment 
in Laos is effectively taxed at 30.1%, while a tax of 30.7% is levied on a Vietnamese 
subsidiary owned by a US parent company. Looking at the national tax code of Laos and 
Vietnam, the Vietnamese tax on corporate income (currently at 22%) is 2 percentage points 
lower than the one in Laos and both countries do not levy any non-income tax. However, 
Laotian tax depreciation patterns for intangibles and machinery allow for faster tax 
depreciation than Vietnamese regulations (2 and 5 years on a straight-line basis compared to 
10 and 7 years) and thus contribute to the increased attractiveness of a subsidiary located in 
Laos. 
                                                 
27  One might argue that multinationals often have the possibility to engage in so-called treaty shopping. 
Multinational conglomerates can exploit favourable tax treaties between specific countries by setting up complex 
corporate structures.  
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Figure 4 - EATRs of US outbound investments in the Asia-Pacific region 
 
Source: Own calculations. For exact values see Table A5. 
 
Our analysis of investments in an international setting shows that several additional factors 
have to be taken into account when evaluating tax burdens of FDI (with partial repatriation of 
income) in the Asia-Pacific region. No matter where the parent company is located, the EATR 
increases compared to a solely domestic scenario. From the perspective of an investor resident 
in a country that exempts foreign dividends, the level of withholding taxes as well as the 
choice of financing are the main drivers of the overall tax burden. Parent companies located in 
jurisdictions, which apply the credit method, on the contrary, cannot benefit from a more 
favourable tax treatment of corporate income at the subsidiary level. In case of a cross-border 
scenario, effective tax burdens of investments in countries where profits are taxed at lower 
rates are effectively grossed-up to the tax level paid at home. Withholding taxes only matter if 
the tax level in the investment’s host country is higher than the one at home.28  
 
 
4. Impact of Corporate Tax Incentives on the Effective Tax Burden 
 
4.1 Overview of Tax Incentives in the Asia-Pacific Region 
In order to promote the investment location of the respective territory, policy makers in all 
countries covered by this study rely on tax incentives. Tax incentives (sometimes also referred 
to as fiscal incentives) are defined as measures that provide preferential tax treatment for 
certain activities, assets, sectors and forms of financing over others and are exceptions to what 
                                                 
28 See, for example, investment by a US parent company in a subsidiary located in the Philippines.  
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is granted under the general tax regime.29 The most common types of tax incentives are so-
called tax holidays, periods for which an investment is fully exempt from taxation, reduced 
tax rates, accelerated depreciation, tax credits and investment allowances. As a general rule, 
all types of fiscal incentives aim at lowering the tax burden30 of a specified investment. In the 
following this paper will focus on tax incentives for corporate investors, which intend to 
encourage economic activity, in particular capital accumulation in certain sectors or 
geographic areas. 
Most countries use fiscal incentives to target specific sectors that are considered essential for 
the country’s economy. New Zealand, for example, offers incentives for the extractive and 
mining industry while China focuses on software and integrated circuit industries. Figure 5 
groups the main types of tax incentive according to the objectives for which they have been 
implemented. The most common reason for tax incentives is the stimulation of research and 
development (R&D) activities and the promotion of development in certain regions of the 
investment’s host country. Regions targeted by tax incentives are mostly remote or less 
developed areas. This type of incentive is also seen as a compensation to the investors for 
increased transportation and communication costs as well as extra costs to attract skilled 
labour.31 While incentives for R&D activities are especially common in developed countries 
of the region, regional incentives are more widespread in developing and less-developed 
countries.32 For a detailed list of incentives offered by each country refer to Table A7, which 
is included in the appendix. Arguing that good infrastructure attracts new investment,33 most 
transition economies also encourage investors to engage in infrastructure development 
projects. A rather new phenomenon is incentives for investments in renewable energy, 
environmental protection projects and environmental-friendly equipment and machinery,34 
which has become especially popular among advanced economies. Both types of incentives 
have been implemented by nearly half of the Asia-Pacific countries. Many fiscal incentives 
also address unemployment issues, while a growing number of incentives aim at improving 
the quality of the local labour force by providing special tax benefits for employee training. 
To mention some prominent examples, Japan grants a tax credit of 10% on the increased 
amount of salary payments if the wage level rises by 5% or more compared to a specified base 
year. In Malaysia, expenses for training activities for local employees of a manufacturing 
business, which has not yet started its core operations can be deducted twice. Although so far 
incentives for high technology industries are not among the most widespread incentives in the 
region, very often these incentives offer the most beneficial tax treatment for investors as we 
will show in the following.  
 
                                                 
29 See Shah (1995) p. 2; UNCTAD (2000) p. 12; Klemm (2010) pp. 315 f. Definitions in these papers differ 
slightly depending on the focus of the respective work. For the purpose of this paper, a combination of these 
definitions that best fits the usage of the term "tax incentive" throughout the following pages is adopted. 
30 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p. 1497. 
31 See UNCTAD (2000) p.15. 
32  For the purpose of this paper, countries are classified into "advanced economies" and "emerging and 
developing" countries according to the World Economic Outlook groups of the IMF. The group of the least 
developed countries is adopted from the United Nations Statistic Division. 
33 See Introduction and OECD (2007) p.77. 
34 These investment types are summarized as "environmental protection" in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 – Targets of tax incentives in the Asia-Pacific region 
 
Source: Own survey based on IBFD Tax Research Platform. 
This figure illustrates the total number of countries in Asia-Pacific that introduced the respective type of tax 
incentives. 
 
4.2 Impact of Tax Incentives on the EATR 
As a first step, we compute the EATRs for investments that qualifies for the most beneficial 
tax incentive in terms of tax reduction. Thereafter incentives for specific geographic regions 
and investments in the high technology sector will be analysed in greater detail.  
We now include different types of fiscal incentives, namely accelerated depreciation, tax 
credits, tax holidays and reduced tax rates in the initial model. Accelerated depreciation 
speeds up depreciation of industrial buildings, machinery and intangibles. Timing effects 
resulting from the time value of money increase the present value of depreciation allowances 
and thus reduce the investment’s tax base.35 Tax credits lower an investment’s tax burden by 
being directly added to the present value of tax allowances.36 Tax holidays and reductions of 
the corporate income tax rate are captured by the present value of the respective tax rate. For 
profitable investments,37 fiscal incentives such as tax holidays, which directly impact the tax 
rate applied, have a larger effect on an investment’s effective tax burden than measures 
reducing the investment’s tax base. This outcome becomes plausible when looking at the 
model applied in our analysis. When computing the EATR we consider a profitable 
investment instead of a marginal investment. In this setting the statutory tax rate's impact is 
                                                 
35 For a detailed explanation of the so-called tax base effect see Schreiber (2013) p. 30. 
36 See King/Fullerton (1984) p.19. 
37 Our analysis assumes a profitable investment compared to a marginal investment. See Table A1 – Underlying 
assumptions. 
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more significant. Meanwhile, effects arising from the computation of the tax base are limited, 
as the present value of tax allowances is independent from the investment's profitability. 
Some countries like Australia, Japan and Taiwan offer incentives for R&D activities. 
However, since the focus of this paper is on investments by a manufacturing entity, such 
incentives will not be included in the analysis. 38  Moreover, we further exclude certain 
incentives as those for exploration projects of the extractive industries in New Zealand.39 
Table 1 summarizes the incentives modelled for the remaining 15 countries and briefly 
describes the conditions under which they are offered.   
                                                 
38 For studies on the impact of tax regimes that promote R&D activities see among others Ernst/Spengel (2011) 
and Evers/Miller/Spengel (forthcoming).   
39 For a detailed description of additional tax incentives offered by countries in the Asia-Pacific region see 
Endres/Fuest/Spengel et al. (2010).  
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Table 1 – Overview of tax incentives available for manufacturing entities in Asia-Pacific 
Jurisdiction Type of incentive Target* Conditions 
Cambodia Tax holiday of 6 years - Qualified investment projects involved in 
the production and processing of goods. 
China Permanently reduced corporate 
income tax rate of 15% and a 
tax holiday of 2 years followed 
by a 50% reduced tax rate for 3 
years 
Regional & 
high technology 
Foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) 
investing in Western regions of the 
country are all subject to the reduced tax 
rate. If the investment is undertaken in the 
Xinjiang Province, the investment is 
further eligible to the tax holiday and the 
temporary reduction. NHTEs can also 
receive this additional incentive if located 
in one of the Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs). 
  Permanently reduced corporate 
income tax rate of 15% 
High technology New and high technology enterprises 
(NHTE) 
Hong Kong 100% write-off for new capital 
expenditure 
Environmental 
protection 
High-value manufacturing businesses 
investing in plant and machinery for 
manufacturing, in computer hardware and 
software or environmental protection 
facilities. 
India Tax holiday of 5 years followed 
by a 50% reduced tax rate for 
10 years 
- Newly established investments that 
manufacture goods or offer services in 
one of the SEZs. 
  Tax holiday of 10 years Regional Manufacturing projects located in one of 
the North Eastern states. 
Indonesia Tax holiday of 10 years - Companies that operate in one of the 5 
designated pioneer industries basic 
metals, oil refining and petrochemicals, 
renewable resources, industrial machinery 
and telecommunication equipment. 
  Accelerated depreciation at 
double rates for buildings, other 
tangible and intangible assets, 
50% reduction of withholding 
tax on dividends 
Regional Businesses located in economic 
development zones or hardship areas that 
lack social and economic infrastructure. 
Laos Tax holiday of 10 years Regional Investments in zone 1, which is described 
as remote areas where no economic 
infrastructure exists and activities 
specified as level 1. The Investment 
Promotion Law of 2009 assigns most 
manufacturing activities to level 1.  
Malaysia Tax holiday of 5 years Regional & 
high technology 
Entities with pioneer status, which engage 
in promoted activities such as high 
technology or are located in promoted 
areas.  
Mongolia Tax credit of 10% - Entities starting new, expanding or 
renovating existing production in certain 
priority sectors. 
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Myanmar Tax holiday of 5 years, followed 
by a 50% reduced tax rate for 5 
years plus additional 5 years for 
reinvested profits 
Regional & 
export 
Foreign investments carried out in a SEZ. 
After the expiry of this incentive 
additional tax reliefs for exporting 
enterprises are possible.  
Philippines Tax holiday of 6 years Regional Newly established pioneer firms that, for 
example, produce products that are not 
yet manufactured in the Philippines or 
enterprises located in less-developed 
areas.  
Russia Depreciation at double rates 
and exemption from property 
tax for 5 years 
Regional Investments located in SEZs. 
Singapore Tax holiday of 15 years High technology Projects that are considered to have 
favourable prospects for development and 
are not yet undertaken at a sufficient scale 
in Singapore.  
South Korea Tax holiday of 5 years followed 
by a 50% reduced tax rate for 2 
years 
High technology High technology enterprises located in 
foreign investment zones. 
Thailand Tax holiday of 8 years followed 
by a 50% reduced tax rate for 5 
years 
Regional Investment in the predefined zone 3 (less 
industrialized regions of the country) 
receive a full exemption of 8 years and if 
the project is also located in one of the 
special promoted zones the additional 
reduction is granted. 
  Tax holiday of 8 years High technology 
& environmental 
protection 
Among others, activities that involve high 
technology or eco-friendly material and 
products. 
Vietnam 10% corporate income tax for a 
period of 15 years, which 
include full exemption for 4 
years and a further reduction to 
5% for 9 years. 
Regional & 
High technology 
 
Projects undertaken in areas with extreme 
socio-economic difficulties, investments 
located in economic or high technology 
zones, investments in the high technology 
sector and enterprises that manufacture 
software products 
Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform 
* In this table targets of the respective incentive are mentioned, if they can be assigned to one of the categories 
introduced in Figure 5. 
This table summarizes all tax incentives (except for headquarters) that are incorporated in our analysis on 
effective tax burdens in the Asia-Pacific region. In line with our assumptions (see Table A1) we only consider 
tax incentives for manufacturing entities. For each country the incentives that result in the lowest tax burden are 
written in italics.  
In case of China and Malaysia more favourable incentives would be available. However, both incentives apply 
for rather special cases. In Malaysia the project has to be recognized as one of strategic and national importance 
and in China the incentive is granted for entities engaged in public basic infrastructure projects or environmental 
protection projects. For India incentives for firms operating in SEZs are not considered as regional incentives, as 
the objective of the zones is to provide a competitive environment for exporting entities rather than promoting 
economic development of these regions. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the impact the most favourable incentives for each of territory have on an 
investment’s effective tax burden. Except for Hong Kong and Russia, which offer accelerated 
depreciation for certain assets, in all other jurisdictions incentives offered as tax holidays and 
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reduced tax rates provide the largest benefits for investors. In Singapore, Vietnam, Laos, 
Indonesia and China the EATR is lowered by half or more of the original tax burden. In this 
setting Hong Kong no longer offers the most attractive tax schedule. A tax holiday of 15 years 
reduces the EATR for investments in Singaporean pioneer industries to 7%. Tax incentives 
available in Vietnam and Thailand also result in EATRs below the 10% threshold. 
Meanwhile, Indonesia and China, two territories where the EATR for a standard investment is 
above average, become even more attractive than low-tax jurisdictions such as Cambodia and 
Russia. The highest possible EATR of an investment eligible for a preferential tax treatment is 
22.6% and available for investments located in special economic zones in India.  
Excluding the territories for which no incentives have been modelled,40 the EATR is on 
average reduced by 8.6 percentage points for investments in the Asia-Pacific region. 
However, this result would change if one considers a cross-border investment of an investor, 
whose home country applies the credit method as the US do. Such a tax regime causes the 
investor’s gains from tax incentives to nearly vanish completely. In case of reduced tax rates 
or full exemption, the investment is still taxed at the higher US tax rate. The tax incentive thus 
simply shifts tax revenue from the host country to the home country.  
In this context it is important to pay attention to the conditions an investment has to match in 
order to be eligible for the incentives mentioned above. If incentives of different targets are 
considered simultaneously, comparing investments with and without incentives in a specified 
country will lead to more robust conclusions than comparing jurisdictions among each other. 
 
Figure 6 – Impact of the most beneficial tax incentives offered by each jurisdiction on the 
effective average tax burden 
 
Source: Own calculations. For exact values see Table A8.In this diagram we only consider tax incentives 
resulting in the lowest effective average tax burden for a domestic investment. The dashed lines indicate the 
respective average EATR for investments with and without incentives. In this diagram the average of countries 
for which incentives have been modelled is used. 
                                                 
40 These jurisdictions are Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Taiwan. 
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4.3 Focus on Regional and High Technology Tax Incentives 
So far our analysis has been limited to the most generous tax incentives in the Asia-Pacific 
region, illustrating important effects of such regulations. However, it is essential to bear in 
mind that not every investment project fulfils the requirements for these incentives. We 
showed that besides promoting R&D activities, stimulating investment in selected geographic 
areas is the most common objective for policy makers to implement tax incentives. In half of 
the countries, incentives promoting development in specific regions result in the lowest 
effective tax burden. These countries are Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, China, Myanmar, Russia 
and the Philippines. Considering the impact of regional incentives on an investment’s EATR, 
they reduce the tax burden by 5.7 percentage points on average. However, the majority of 
these incentives is only granted for investments in geographic areas that lack sufficient 
infrastructure and thus might require additional expenditures. Whether or not favourable 
taxation fully compensates the investor for such extra expenses remains uncertain. Several 
studies dealing with the merits of tax incentives in stimulating investment point out that the 
option of simply addressing such structural deficiencies by implementing tax incentives is 
only second best.41 They all conclude that if certain preconditions are not met, tax incentives 
will not be successful in attracting new investment. Governments should thus simultaneously 
try to reduce costs for such investments by investing in public infrastructure, education of the 
labour force and similar areas.42 
Besides incentives targeted at the development of certain parts of a country, incentives 
implemented to increase investment in the high technology sector offer very favourable 
conditions for investors. In Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Vietnam such an 
investment is eligible for the most beneficial incentive. In China high technology enterprises 
have to be located in one of the SEZs to receive the most preferential tax treatment. However, 
independent of their location, these investments are already subject to a permanently reduced 
corporate income tax rate of 15% compared to the standard rate of 25%. In Malaysia and 
Vietnam the tax treatment for investments in promoted regions and projects involving high 
technology is identical. Figure 7 compares the effective tax burden of investments eligible for 
regional and high technology incentives to investments that receive the most preferential tax 
treatment (independent of their preconditions) and to a standard domestic investment (see 
section 3). If the precondition of an investment that bears the lowest tax burden is related to 
its geographic location and/or the high technology sector, the EATR is again displayed in the 
respective column for regional and high technology incentives. Finally, it can be concluded 
that tax incentives, which have the highest impact on the tax burden of an investment in Asia-
Pacific, either try to promote regional development or investments in the high technology 
sector. The only exceptions to this conclusion are the two countries Cambodia and Mongolia, 
where the most favourable incentives are targeted at other industries.  
 
                                                 
41 See UNCTAD (2000) p. 15, Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p. 1499 and Klemm (2010) p. 334. 
42 See UNCTAD (2000) and Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002). 
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Figure 7 – Effective average tax burdens of investments targeted by high technology and 
regional incentives  
 
Source: Own calculations. For exact values see Table A8. 
The figure above compares the impact of tax incentives that result in the lowest tax burden to tax incentives for 
investments in the high technology sector, in specific geographic regions and to a standard investment that does 
not qualify for any incentive. If no regional or high technology incentive is available for the respective 
jurisdiction, the EATR for a standard investment is depicted instead.  
 
4.4 Tax Incentives Promoting the Establishment of Headquarters 
As mentioned above, Singapore’s incentive regime also offers special taxation rules 
implemented to attract regional and international headquarters (RHQs and IHQs). 43 However, 
competition from other Asia-Pacific jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, China, Malaysia and 
Thailand is fierce,44 since having headquarters located in their country is often regarded as 
desirable by policy makers. Clausing (2010) states spill-over effects from R&D and 
entrepreneurial activities and higher wage levels as possible benefits from headquarter 
activities. Moreover, Dischinger, Knoll and Riedel (2014) show that multinational 
headquarters are more profitable than their subsidiaries using panel data of European 
multinationals. Four countries in South East Asia and Australia thus provide special 
incentives to stimulate the establishment of RHQs and IHQs.45 
                                                 
43 Whether an investment is considered a regional or an international headquarter depends on the level of 
commitment by the investor which has to differ substantially from the minimum requirements for a regional 
headquarter.  
44 See Leow/Wong/Ke (2010) p. 147. 
45 Australia, for example, defines regional headquarters as corporations which provide support to their associated 
companies located in other countries in the same region and act as intermediaries between associated companies 
and the non-resident parent company. In Singapore eligible corporations have to fulfil additional requirements 
such as a certain level of skilled workers, paid-up capital, activities etc. For a general discussion on the definition 
of headquarters for tax purposes see Clausing (2010) pp. 742-744. 
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If located in Singapore, RHQs are awarded a reduced concessionary tax rate of 15% for 3 
years, while IHQs can get a tax holiday for a maximum period of 20 years on incremental 
income.46 These incentives have a significant impact on the tax burden on incremental income 
directly generated by the respective headquarter.47 The incentive’s impact on cross-border 
investments, however, is limited, as Singapore applies the exemption method for taxation of 
foreign dividends. Figure 8 compares the standard case presented in section 3.2 to an 
investment covered by Singapore's RHQ and IHQ awards. For Taiwan, Thailand, India, the 
Philippines and Cambodia the reduced corporate income tax rate granted by the IHQ award 
even has a negative effect on outbound investments to these countries. All of these 
jurisdictions levy particularly high withholding taxes on interest payments. If the home 
country’s tax burden (in this case Singapore) drops below the withholding tax rate for interest 
payments, these withholding tax rates are final and the incentive loses its attractiveness. The 
tax burden on interest payments by the foreign subsidiary cannot be further reduced. 
Meanwhile, a lower corporate income tax rate impairs the parent company’s tax shield. The 
fact that these two effects occur simultaneously leads to increased EATRs on Singaporean 
outbound investments to these countries.  
 
Figure 8 – Comparison of effective average tax rates on outbound investments by a 
Singaporean headquarter  
 
Source: Own calculations. For exact values see Table A9. 
The figure displays standard investments by a Singaporean parent company, which have been introduced in 
section 3. These investments are now compared to two scenarios where the parent company is eligible for the 
RHQ award and IHQ award respectively and thus faces a lower corporate income tax rate in Singapore.  
                                                 
46 The final incentive package awarded to international headquarters is subject to negotiations with the Economic 
Development Board (EDB). See Leow/Wong/Ke (2010) p.145. 
47 The model applied in our analysis is limited to dividends and interest payments between affiliates. Therefore 
the exact impact of headquarter incentives on the tax burden on management fees, royalties and other payments 
cannot be assessed by this model. Those payments, however, add up to income directly generated by headquarter 
activities. For a detailed analysis measuring the effective tax burden of different headquarter services (e.g. 
holding, financing and R&D functions) see Bellingwout/Evers/Heckemeyer/Spengel (2012). 
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5. Conclusion 
The Asia-Pacific region has experienced dramatic economic transformations in the past 
decades. This development process has not come to a halt yet. Private investments are major 
drivers behind these economic dynamics, while taxation is one factor that influences location 
decisions of such investments. This paper takes a closer look at different tax policies 
implemented by 19 jurisdictions in Asia-Pacific and assesses the impact these policies have 
on the effective tax burden of investments. As a first step we compare national regulations on 
depreciation and amortization of assets used by manufacturing entities, describe valuation 
methods and tax rates on profits and property for each country. Based on these parameters, we 
apply a widely accepted approach introduced by Devereux and Griffith (1999 and 2003) to 
compute effective average tax burdens on investments in the Asia-Pacific region. Our analysis 
reveals the average EATR on domestic investments in all countries to be 23.4%, while exact 
values range from 10.6% in Hong Kong to 40.4% in India. The taxation of cross-border 
investments further depends on the way foreign income is taxed in the investor’s residence 
country. Whereas investors from Singapore and Germany benefit from the exemption of 
dividend income, if tax payments to authorities in the investment’s host country are lower 
than at home, the credit method applied by the US government causes advantages resulting 
from lower tax rates in Asia-Pacific to almost vanish completely. FDI in any of the Asia-
Pacific jurisdictions by companies from Singapore or Germany is on average taxed at 29.2% 
and at 32.8% if undertaken by a US parent company. The comparison of investments by a 
Singaporean and a German investor illustrate the importance of withholding taxes on 
dividends and interest payments as well as of international tax treaties. A Singaporean parent 
company investing in a Taiwanese subsidiary faces an EATR of 32.6%, whereas the EATR is 
at 25.3% for its German counterpart. Hereby the German investor benefits from withholding 
taxes that have been lowered by 50% by an agreement between the Taiwanese and German 
government. In order to attract additional investment to certain geographic areas, promoted 
industries or to reallocate resources to activities with spillover effects, policy makers in the 
Asia-Pacific region rely on tax incentives. Considering fiscal incentives that result in the 
lowest possible tax burden, such regulations can reduce the EATR by more than 50%. 
Incentives promoting the high technology sector or regions with socio-economic difficulties 
offer the most preferential tax treatment for investments in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, 
regulations targeted at the development of predefined geographic areas are the most 
widespread type of tax incentives. Promising spill-over effects from headquarter activities 
motivate countries to introduce regulations that aim at attracting such investments. Our 
analysis for Singapore shows that cross-border tax regulations limit the impact these 
incentives have on FDI. The tax reducing effect is likely to be more significant if service 
activities and payments such as management fees are considered. Such an analysis, however, 
is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 – Underlying assumptions 
Assumption on... Value 
Legal form Corporation 
Assets (weight) for manufacturing projects Industrial building (20%),  
intangible asset (20%), machinery (20%), 
financial asset (20%), inventory (20%) 
Sources of finance (weight) Retained earnings (55%), new equity (10%), 
debt (35%) 
True economic depreciation Declining balance method;  
industrial buildings 3.1%, intangibles 
15.35%, machinery 17.5% 
Real interest rate 5% 
Pre-tax real rate of return 20% 
Inflation rate  2% 
Source: Endres/Fuest/Spengel et al. (2010) p. 17 and European Commission (2013). 
 
Table A2 – Corporate income tax rates and other profit taxes 
Jurisdiction Nominal corporate income tax  
Nominal 
Surcharge 
Nominal             
local profit tax 
Combined 
statutory tax rate 
Australia 30.0% - - 30.0% 
Cambodia 20.0% - - 20.0% 
China 25.0% - - 25.0% 
Hong Kong 16.5% - - 16.5% 
India 30.0%/40.5% 13.3% - 34.0%/45.2% 
Indonesia 25.0% - - 25.0% 
Japan 25.5%* 20.7% 7.7% 35.7% 
Laos 24.0% - - 24.0% 
Malaysia 25.0% - - 25.0% 
Mongolia 25.0% - - 25.0% 
Myanmar 25.0% - - 25.0% 
New Zealand 28.0% - - 28.0% 
Philippines 30.0% - 0.8% 30.5% 
Russia 20.0% - - 20.0% 
Singapore 17.0% - - 17.0% 
South Korea 22.0% 10.0% - 24.2% 
Taiwan 17.0% 10.0%   25.3%/17.0% 
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Thailand 20.0% - - 20.0% 
Vietnam 22.0% - - 22.0% 
Germany 15.0% 5.5% 15.1%** 31.0% 
United States 35.0% - 8.8% 37.9%*** 
Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform. 
* Until March 2015, corporations in Japan are subject to a 10% surcharge on the corporate tax liability for 
reconstruction funding after the earthquake in 2011. This surcharge has not been included. 
** The local profit tax in Germany comprises a basic rate of 3.5% which is then multiplied by local multiplier set 
by each municipality. We assume a multiplier of 432, which represents the average rate of 2009 for 
municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. This assumption follows European Commission (2013).  
*** For the purpose of this paper, the corporate income tax rate levied in California is considered. In addition to 
the state tax on corporate income, the combined statutory tax rate includes a 9% deduction on federal tax 
available for domestic production activities. 
 
Table A3 – Real estate and property tax rates 
Jurisdiction 
  
Real estate tax Property tax 
Nominal Real Nominal Real Assets covered 
Australia - - - - - 
Cambodia 0.10% 0.08% - - - 
China 0.96% 0.72% - - - 
Hong Kong - - - - - 
India 2.48% 1.64% - - - 
Indonesia 0.20% 0.15% - - - 
Japan 0.30% 0.19% 1.40% 0.90% All assets 
Laos - - - - - 
Malaysia - - - - - 
Mongolia - - 0.45% 0.45% Buildings and machinery 
Myanmar - - - - - 
New Zealand - - - - - 
Philippines - - 2.40% 1.68% Buildings and machinery 
Russia 2.00% 1.60% - - - 
Singapore 0.50% 0.42% - - - 
South Korea 0.23% 0.17% - - - 
Taiwan 1.50% 1.12% - - - 
Thailand 1.00% 0.80% - - - 
Vietnam - - - - - 
Germany 0.41 0.28% - - - 
USA - - 1.00% 0.62% Buildings and machinery 
Source:  IBFD Tax Research Platform.
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Table A4 – Depreciation and amortization of assets and inventory valuation  
Jurisdiction 
Industrial Buildings Intangibles  Machinery Inventory valuation 
Kind of 
allowance 
Allowance 
rate (%) 
Useful life 
(years) 
Kind of 
allowance 
Allowance 
rate  
Useful life  Kind of 
allowance 
Allowance 
rate Useful life  
Australia SL 2.5 40 SL 5 20 DB 28.57 ufd Weighted average 
Cambodia SL 5 20 SL 10 10 DB 20 ufd Weighted average 
China SL 5 20 SL 10 10 SL 10 10 Weighted average 
Hong Kong SL 4+ 20% initially 20 SL 100 1 DB 
20 + 60 
initially  ufd Weighted average 
India DB 10 ufd DB 25 ufd DB 15 ufd Weighted average 
Indonesia SL 5 20 DB 12.5 ufd DB 12.5 ufd Weighted average 
Japan SL 2.6316 38 SL 12.5 8 DB 25 10 Weighted average 
Laos SL 2 50 SL 50 2 SL 20 5 Weighted average 
Malaysia 
SL 
3 + 10 
initially 
30 SL 20 5 SL  14 + 20 initially 6 Weighted average 
Mongolia SL 2.5 40 SL 10 10 SL 10 10 Weighted average 
Myanmar SL 15+3*  SL 10 10 SL 10 10 LIFO 
New Zealand Useful life of 100 years  SL 10  10 DB  13 15 Weighted average 
Philippines SYD var 30 SYD var 10 SYD var 7 Weighted average 
Russia SL 10+3.1* 30 SL 10 10 DB 33.33 + 30 initially 2 LIFO 
Singapore - - - - - - SL 33.33 3 Weighted average 
South Korea SL 2.5 40 SL 10 10 DB 45.1 ufd LIFO 
Taiwan DB 4.5 50 SL 10 10 SL 14.2857 7 LIFO 
Thailand SL 5 20 SYD var 10 SYD var 7 LIFO 
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Vietnam SL 3.3333 30 SL 10 10 SL 14.2857 7 LIFO 
Germany SL 3 33.3333 SL 20 5 SL 14.2857 7 LIFO 
USA 
SL 
2.46 + 
2.56 + 
0.11** 
30 SL 6.6667 15 DB 14.29 + 24.49*** 8 LIFO 
Source: IBFD Tax Reasearch Platform. 
The allowance method modeled represents the most tax-efficient method available under the respective tax regime. SL straight line, DB declining balance, SYD sum of years' 
digit, var varying depreciation rate, ufd until fully depreciated, LIFO last-in-first-out 
* 15% (10%) initial deprecation allowance in year of construction and 3% (3.1%) annually afterwards. 
** 2.46% in year 1, 2.56% for 38 years plus 0.11 in year 30. 
*** 14.29% in year 1, 24.49% for 6 years plus final write-off in year 8. 
 
Table A5 – Effective average tax rates for domestic investments and cross-border investments by a German,  
Singaporean and US parent company  
Jurisdiction Domestic investment 
Cross-border investments 
German parent company Singaporean parent company US parent company 
Australia 28.6% 38.6% 38.7% 32.3% 
Cambodia 18.4% 29.4% 29.3% 30.7% 
China 23.9% 31.5% 28.4% 31.8% 
Hong Kong 10.6% 12.1% 11.9% 29.1% 
India 40.4% 42.9% 43.2% 41.4% 
Indonesia 23.9% 31.6% 31.6% 31.9% 
Japan 37.5% 43.6% 41.4% 37.1% 
Laos 21.1% 29.0% 29.0% 30.1% 
Malaysia 21.9% 23.4% 23.4% 30.1% 
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Mongolia 24.5% 28.9% 29.0% 36.5% 
Myanmar 23.0% 24.4% 24.4% 31.0% 
New Zealand 27.3% 37.5% 31.7% 32.6% 
Philippines 30.4% 37.3% 40.3% 38.4% 
Russia 19.1% 24.0% 23.9% 31.3% 
Singapore 18.6% 20.1% 18.0% 32.9% 
South Korea 21.8% 26.5% 29.7% 30.6% 
Taiwan 14.9% 25.3% 32.6% 33.3% 
Thailand 18.3% 26.6% 26.5% 30.7% 
Vietnam 20.0% 21.4% 21.4% 30.7% 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table A6 – Withholding tax rates on dividends and interests paid to Germany, Singapore and the US 
Subsidiary  
German Parent Company Singaporean Parent Company US Parent Company 
Dividends Interest Dividends Interest Dividends Interest 
Australia 15% 10% 15% 10% - 10% 
Cambodia 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 
China 10% 10% 5% 10% 10% 10% 
Hong Kong - - - - - - 
India - 10% - 15% - 15% 
Indonesia 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Japan 10% 10% 5% 10% - 10% 
Laos 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Malaysia - 10% - 10% - 15% 
Mongolia 5% 10% 5% 10% 20% 20% 
Myanmar - 15% - 10% - 15% 
New Zealand 15% 10% 5% 10% - 10% 
Philippines 10% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
Russia 5% - 5% 8% 5% - 
Singapore - 8% - - - 15% 
South Korea 5% 10% 10% 12% 10% 10% 
Taiwan 10% 10% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
Thailand 10% 15% 10% 15% 10% 15% 
Vietnam - 10% 5% 10% - 10% 
Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform. 
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Table A7 – Targets of tax incentives in the Asia-Pacific region by jurisdiction  
 Jurisdiction R&D Environmental Protection 
Employment & 
Vocational Training
High 
Technology Headquarter Regional 
Infrastructure 
Development Export Import 
Australia x x x   x         
Cambodia             x x x 
China x x   x   x x     
Hong Kong   x               
India     x     x x x   
Indonesia           x x x x 
Japan x x x             
Laos x   x     x   x   
Malaysia x x x x x x x x   
Mongolia             x     
Myanmar           x   x x 
New Zealand x                 
Philippines x   x   x x x x   
Russia x x       x       
Singapore x x   x x         
South Korea     x x           
Taiwan x                 
Thailand   x   x x x x x x 
Vietnam     x x   x x   x 
Source: Own survey based on IBFD Tax Research Platform.  
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Table A8 – Effective average tax rates of investments eligible for tax incentives 
Jurisdiction Incentive resulting in lowest tax burden Regional incentive 
High technology 
incentive 
EATR without 
incentive 
Cambodia 12.2% 18.4% 18.4% 18.4% 
China 11.7% 11.7% 14.6% 23.9% 
Hong Kong 10.3% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 
India 22.6% 25.5% 40.4% 40.4% 
Indonesia 11.4% 22.1% 23.9% 23.9% 
Laos 10.6% 10.6% 21.1% 21.1% 
Malaysia 15.6% 15.6% 15.6% 21.9% 
Mongolia 19.4% 24.5% 24.5% 24.5% 
Myanmar 12.9% 12.9% 23.0% 23.0% 
Philippines 22.0% 22.0% 30.4% 30.4% 
Russia 17.8% 17.8% 19.1% 19.1% 
Singapore 7.0% 18.6% 7.0% 18.6% 
South Korea 14.5% 21.8% 14.5% 21.8% 
Thailand 9.6% 9.6% 11.0% 18.3% 
Vietnam 9.2% 9.2% 9.2% 20.0% 
Source: Own calculations. See Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
 
Table A9 - Comparison of effective average tax rates on outbound investments by a  
Singaporean headquarter 
Jurisdiction EATR standard cross-border investment EATR RHQ award EATR IHQ award 
Australia 38.73% 38.68% 38.43% 
Cambodia 29.34% 29.29% 29.50% 
China 28.43% 28.39% 28.14% 
Hong Kong 11.92% 11.88% 10.96% 
India 43.22% 43.18% 43.51% 
Indonesia 31.62% 31.57% 31.32% 
Japan 41.41% 41.36% 41.11% 
Laos 29.02% 28.97% 28.72% 
Malaysia 23.36% 23.32% 23.07% 
Mongolia 28.99% 28.95% 28.69% 
Myanmar 24.40% 24.36% 24.11% 
New Zealand 31.68% 31.64% 31.38% 
Philippines 40.27% 40.23% 40.56% 
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Russia 23.91% 23.87% 23.32% 
South Korea 29.70% 29.66% 29.41% 
Taiwan 32.57% 32.60% 33.09% 
Thailand 26.53% 26.48% 26.81% 
Vietnam 21.41% 21.37% 21.12% 
Source: Own calculations. See Figure 8. 
